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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
New millennium, old fears 
20 December was the Day of the Security Services, and the heirs of the KGB 
celebrated the 80th birthday of the legacy with flair -- those who had really 
distinguished themselves received medals from President Putin himself, and the 
rest were rewarded with his kind words and the 22-track CD of songs "by spies, 
about spies and for spies." (THE CALGARY HERALD, 26 Dec 00; via lexis-nexis) 
However, the confidence expressed by the president that the past has been left 
behind, that "the times when [the security service] was used for suppression are 
gone," is not shared by all. (RUSSIA TV, 20 Dec 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
One draft law on the rebuilding of a more inclusive security service structure had 
failed in the State Duma in November. However, it is not unlikely that a slightly 
more modest conglomerate -- one which would add the Federal Agency for 
Government Communications and Information as well as the Federal Protection 
Service (but neither the Foreign Intelligence Service nor the Border Troops) to 
the Federal Security Service -- would succeed, and result in an even more 
powerful and single-minded organ. Furthermore, there is speculation that, in the 
wake of the restoration of Soviet-era symbols, such as the music of the Soviet 
anthem and the red banner for the armed forces, the name KGB itself would be 
brought back. (SEGODNYA, 5 Jan 01; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via 
lexis-nexis) 
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A particularly dangerous concept, one former KGB general, Oleg Kalyugin, 
suggested, is that recently "the Chekisty have been extremely successful at 
resurrecting the myth that Russia is under threat from foreign enemies and at 
creating an aura of glory around [their] past services to the homeland." (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 20 Dec 00; via lexis-nexis) Taking advantage of the Russian 
population's not unreasonable desire for peace and order, the FSB is becoming 
progressively more aggressive and deliberate in pursuing so-called spies and 
instigating anti-Chechen, as well as anti-Western, sentiments. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
First steps towards spring cleaning? 
 
On 28 December 2000, President Putin submitted a draft of the federal law "on 
political parties" (developed by a working group of the Central Electoral 
Commission) to the State Duma. An attached explanatory memo indicates that 
the law is necessitated by the need for a "clearer definition of the role and place 
of political parties among the institutions of civil society." The proposed definition 
is "a voluntary association of Russian Federation citizens, created with the 
purpose of participation in the political life of the nation by forming and 
expressing the political will of the citizens, participating in elections, and 
representing the interests of the citizens in the state's legislative organs and in 
local government." To be registered as a political party, the organization must 
have a minimum of 10,000 members, with at least 100 members in at least half 
of the nation's 89 regions. Only Russian Federation citizens of 18 years of age or 
older (who are not incarcerated or deemed incapacitated) can be party members 
or contribute funds, and all party organs must be located on the territory of the 
Russian Federation. Several regulations are introduced: Time limits are set for 
registration procedures, certain documents now are required for registration and 
transparency of the party's financial activities is demanded. Direct government 
financing of the parties, proportional to the number of members registered in the 
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latest State Duma or to voting percentage in presidential elections (if passing the 
3-percent hurdle) is provided for -- therefore, the only commercial activities a 
party is allowed to conduct to gather additional funds are the sale of party-symbol 
souvenirs and publishing enterprises. 
 
The parties must not work against the unity, or against the basic constitutional 
order of the Russian Federation. A party, or its regional branches, can be 
liquidated by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 
(DRAFT OF THE LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES; via www.fci.ru, official website 
of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation) 
 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov, the chairman of the commission, predicted that of the 
approximately 200 parties currently registered, between 10 and 30 would make 
the cut. While members of the major political parties took part in the development 
of the draft, many parties are opposed to at least some aspects of the proposed 
law: In particular, the Union of Right Forces is against government financing, the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation opposes the ban on commercial 
activities, and the Russian Regions Group is unenthusiastic about the elimination 
of regional parties. (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
REGIONS 
Less is more 
Governors of several regions have exchanged their views on a supposed plan for 
merging some of the 89 regions of the Russian Federation to as few as 50. 
Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev noted that, "Tatarstan will not argue if any 
other region wishes to be annexed to it there are many territories desiring to be 
part of Tatarstan." (ITAR-TASS, 0709 GMT, 7 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0107, via 
World News Connection) In other parts of the former Soviet Union, this prospect 
arouses less optimism. According to the alarmed Georgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the list of new subjects mentioned as eligible to join the Russian 
Federation (following the appropriate additions to the Constitution) includes 
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persons in Georgia's Abkhazia and Samachablo (South Ossetia). (IPRINDA 
NEWS AGENCY, 1210 GMT, 29 Dec 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
Of all ethnic republics, Tatarstan has been the most successful at avoiding 
central control. Recently, the Tatar Duma approved the switch from the Cyrillic to 
the Latin alphabet beginning in the current school year, and a not-unfavorable 
compromise on the issuing of passports has been reached in Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan: Passports will contain an inset in the Tatar and Bashkir 
languages, respectively. (THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 1 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis, 
and ITAR-TASS, 2040 GMT, 15 Dec 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russia and Japan: Deadline passes, deadlock continues 
The deadline may have passed, but the Russo-Japanese deadlock over the 
Kurile Islands and the associated peace treaty remains firmly in place. Despite 
some last-minute diplomatic maneuvering on the Japanese side late in 
December, and some press reports indicating an imminent compromise, the four 
Kurile Islands known as the Northern Territories in Japan seem fated to remain 
under Russian control. 
 
Throughout the last year, a settlement over the islands seemed as distant as 
ever, but, in the face of the self-imposed 31 December 2000 deadline (already 
conveniently pushed forward from 1 January 2000), the Japanese intensified 
their efforts to bring the sides to the negotiating table, but to no avail. Japanese 
Foreign Minister Yohei Kono's trip to Moscow, scheduled for late December, 
never materialized and there is still no firm date for the upcoming Irkutsk meeting 
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between Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Mori. (ITAR-TASS, 27 Dec 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1227, via World News Connection) However, given the recent 
proclivity to postponement and the tenacity of the 44-year deadlock, even if Putin 
and Mori were to meet, it is doubtful that they would accomplish anything more 
than they did at their four meetings in 2000.  
 
After two unsuccessful meetings early in the year, press reports following the 
September 2000 Putin-Mori meeting in Tokyo indicated that the sides might have 
reached a tentative compromise agreement whereby Russia would relinquish 
control of two of the four. Furthermore, reports of an "interim" peace treaty, which 
would set the territorial issue aside until a later, unspecified date, have continued 
to appear in the press. (ITAR-TASS, 1404 GMT, 8 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0908, via World News Connection) However, subsequently, the Russian side 
denied the existence of a compromise. 
 
For the Russians there does not yet seem to be profitable compensation for 
return of the islands. Thus far, the Russians have been able to accomplish their 
objectives in the region without any concessions on the issue. Although the 
Japanese did freeze their loans to Russia, it appears that Russia's diplomatic 
efforts to move Russo-Japanese relations forward even prior to a settlement are 
working. Despite a missed treaty deadline, the Japanese extended a $61 million 
credit to Yakutia to build a tuberculosis center and two hospitals. (ITAR-TASS, 
0614 GMT, 21 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1221, via World News Connection) 
Contacts between the two countries on security matters clearly are not suffering 
either. In early 2000 the Russian Navy chief, Vladimir Kuroedov, met with 
Japanese Maritime Defense Chief Kosei Fujita: Russo-Japanese naval exercises 
were implemented, and a permanent line of communication between the two 
naval forces was established as part of a dual commitment to eliminate the 
numerous fishing boat incidents that occur each year. (RIA NOVOSTI, 18 Feb 
00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) As long as Russia 
continues to obtain what it wants from the Japanese, there is little incentive to 
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relinquish control of the islands when they could be used for greater collateral in 
subsequent dealings with Japan. 
 
For the foreseeable future, barring any dramatic change of heart by the Russian 
government, all indicators suggest that 2001 will not bear any territorial fruit for 
the Japanese. Once again -- to Russia's benefit -- possession is nine-tenths of 
the law. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Sergeev visit paves way for military cooperation, arms sales 
In the first visit of a Russian defense minister since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev met with his counterpart, Iranian Defense Minister 
Ali Shamkhani, and with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in a late 
December, three-day visit to Tehran and Isfahan. Sergeev also met with Hoseyn 
Firuzabadi, head of the Iranian Armed Forces Joint Command Headquarters: 
Yahya Rahim-Safavi, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: and 
Kamal Kharrazi, the foreign minister. 
 
The visit comes on the heels of Russian notification in November that it would 
quit the 1995 Chernomyrdin-Gore agreement to halt conventional arms transfers 
to Iran. Sergeev's visit has paved the way for signing long-term bilateral military 
cooperation agreements and is a suitable lead-in for a possible summit meeting 
of the two leaders later this year. 
 
Prior to the trip, numerous senior Russian officials reiterated that Russia has 
every intention of honoring its obligations to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction technologies and missile control regimes. Leading up to and 
during the visit, various Russian officials repeated that arms sales of systems or 
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spare parts would only include defensive systems. As deputy chief of the General 
Staff, Colonel-General Valery Manilov, stated, "the cooperation between Russia 
and Iran poses no jeopardy to third countries. It is targeted to strengthen peace 
and stability in that important region." (ITAR-TASS, 1359 GMT, 8 Dec 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1208, via World News Connection) 
 
What is driving the initiative? 
Many reasons have been postulated as to Russian motives for this meeting, 
impending military cooperation and arms sales. They could be just another 
Moscow challenge to the American pursuit of a National Missile Defense (NMD) 
system, especially since Iran is one of the "states of concern" which American 
officials have cited as justification for an NMD system. They also could be a 
vehicle to test the new Bush administration and its initial policies in the Gulf 
region. Furthermore, Russia may be looking to establish a strategic partner to 
stem the perceived influence and spread of fundamental Islamic movements, 
such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, towards its southern frontier. Likely there is 
some element of all these reasons in the recent approach; however, a factor 
looming large is support of the Russian arms industry and the potential economic 
benefit of the sales. Speaking from Iran at the conclusion of his visit, Sergeev 
even hinted, "1995 [year of the Chernomyrdin-Gore agreement] brought a lot of 
losses to both parties [Russia and Iran]; there will be no pauses from now on." 
(RIA, 0541 GMT, 28 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1228, via World News Connection) 
 
Increased arms sales match previously stated Russian goals to boost domestic 
defense industries and exports. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 8 Nov 00, for further 
discussion of the Russian arms industry.) Recently, officials have expressed a 
willingness to sell virtually any conventional weapons system to buyers with 
enough cash. In fact, proposed sales to Iran, currently estimated at $4 billion, 
could reach as high as $7-8 billion. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 6 Dec 
00) This would provide a critical influx of currency as the armaments industries 
struggle through the early stages of the latest reform and consolidation program. 
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Agreements reached recently between the Russian and Iranian central banks 
should help to facilitate the funding mechanics of this new cooperation. 
 
Further evidence of an aggressive arms sales policy is seen in Southeast Asia. 
As Aleksandr Simakov, director of the Center for World Armaments Markets, 
recently explained, tactical aircraft sales to China not only reflect improved 
Russo-Chinese military-technical cooperation, but they would also be good 
because China's neighbors may be spurred to increase purchases of combat 
aircraft and defensive systems from Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1417 GMT, 18 Dec 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1218, via World News Connection) This profit-driven motivation 
for arms sales can hardly be seen as a policy pursued by someone concerned 
about "strengthening peace and stability." 
 
Hardware implications 
Following the meetings, Russian military sources indicated that some of the 
equipment under consideration for Iran included the following: 
-Repair two of the three KILO-class submarines 
-Repair, parts and upgrade for SU-24 and MiG-29 combat aircraft 
-Repair, parts and upgrade for T-72 tanks 
-Purchase large numbers of S-300 missile systems, Igla shoulder-fired rockets, 
transport helicopters, SU-25 attack aircraft and radars 
 
The Russian source added that Moscow is ready to offer more submarines, 
missiles, landing and patrol boats, minesweepers and other weapon systems. 
(INTERFAX, 0728 GMT, 28 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1228, via World News 
Connection) Additionally, the two countries agreed to consult on a variety of other 
military doctrinal and organization issues, discuss common threats and 
challenges, hold bilateral exchanges and train Iranian military personnel in 
Russian military academies. (RIA, 0807 GMT, 28 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1228, 
via World News Connection) 
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Tehran's enthusiasm for Russia's return to arms transfers is no surprise given 
Iran's diverse and aging mix of Western military systems dating back to the Shah 
which are now virtually obsolete and difficult to maintain. The T-72, for example, 
is the only tank out of over half a dozen different types in their inventory with 
modern fire control and sighting systems along with capable anti-armor rounds. 
Likewise, their older US-made combat aircraft are virtually impossible to maintain 
as a credible fighting force. However, with other systems apparently under 
consideration, it is difficult to see the "defensive" nature of such systems and 
even more difficult to grasp how other Gulf states could not see them as anything 
other than threatening. 
 
Perhaps the most menacing proposal to regional neighbors and the West is the 
increase in capability, and possibly numbers, of Iranian submarines and other 
naval technology. Sitting alongside the Straits of Hormuz, Iran has the potential 
to threaten shipping through this vital international strait with dire consequences 
for oil exporters and importers alike. Ongoing territorial disputes over islands 
such as Abu Musa and the Tunbs also add to the maritime dimension of the 
threat posed by Iranian naval capability. Possible transfers of advanced Russian 
anti-ship missile technology, mines, and more naval vessels could greatly 
increase Iranian capability relative to other Gulf states. These types of systems 
have little to no value as "defensive" weapons for Iranian maritime interests and 
can only add to nervousness felt by Iran's neighbors and the world economy 
dependent on the uninterrupted flow of affordable oil from the Gulf region. 
 
Arms sales central to Putin foreign policy 
The fact of the matter is Putin appears to be championing export arms sales not 
only to boost domestic defense industries in helping support them for Russian 
rearmament, but also as a cornerstone of his developing foreign policy. 
 
In aircraft sales alone, Russia has been pushing forward deals aggressively in 
recent weeks. China is purchasing SU-27 and SU-30 tactical aircraft as well as 
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A-50 Sheml airborne early-warning radar aircraft. India just concluded a contract 
for licensed production of SU-30 fighters and associated thrust-vectoring 
engines. Over 100 (possibly up to 140) jets will be assembled by Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) over a 15-year period. More than 100 Russian defense 
plants will be involved in the contract as well. Valued at close to $4 billion, "this is 
the largest arms export contract in the history of Russian-Indian military relations" 
according to a communiqué released by Russia's new consolidated arms trading 
company, Rosoboronexport. (INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 28 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-1228, and ITAR-TASS, 1451 GMT, 28 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1228, via 
World News Connection) In past months, Putin and his emissaries in overseas 
delegations have discussed potential arms sales with several other states, many 
former clients of the Soviet Union. These recent initiatives look disturbingly 
similar to policies pursued under Brezhnev in the Soviet days of old. 
 
President Putin also has institutionalized his power over the arms export 
business through recent decrees and statutes. A Military-Technical Cooperation 
Commission has been established to oversee policy and make recommendations 
for foreign sales of Russian weapon systems. This body has wide-ranging 
authority throughout government, industry and academic research institutes to 
draw on information in formulating plans. It is empowered also to "examine the 
differences between the federal organs of executive power arising during the 
organization and implementation of military-technical cooperation and also 
elaborating recommendations for their elimination." (ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, 7 
Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1211, via World News Connection) The governing 
statutes give the Russian president alone the authority to approve the 
commission's membership and he exclusively will decide on the export, leasing, 
transfer, and all other forms of military assistance to foreign clients. These laws, 
when coupled with the recent appointment of former KGB officials loyal to Putin 
to three of the critical posts in the new arms-export business and oversight, give 
Putin virtually unlimited control over foreign arms sales. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Signs of things to come, or the last desperate throes of a dying breed? 
Over the last several months, the central question in the Georgy Gongadze affair 
has changed continually. Is Gongadze dead? Is Kuchma guilty? Who is behind 
the release of the "Kuchma tapes"? Is the investigation of the matter corrupt? 
Can Kuchma withstand the pressure? And finally, the question that now seems 
inevitable: When and how will President Leonid Kuchma lose power? As public 
demonstrations increase, media pressure mounts and more parliamentarians 
desert him daily, it has become likely that, barring the release of extraordinary 
evidence supporting his statements, Kuchma will be forced to resign. And, 
perhaps, he ought to consider it. 
 
Yes, it is possible that Kuchma's voice was not actually on the so-called "Moroz-
Kuchma tapes." It is entirely possible that he knows nothing about what really 
happened to Gongadze. It is possible that Kuchma is the victim in all of this. An 
open, timely investigation of the matter might have shown this to be true. 
Unfortunately, the crude, inept and arrogant attempts of Ukrainian Prosecutor-
General Mikhaylo Potebenko to stall the investigation into Gongadze's death 
have cast doubt on this possibility, while the actions of other government 
representatives almost guarantee that Kuchma increasingly will be viewed with 
distrust. 
 
Since the decapitated body of Georgy Gongadze was discovered in the woods of 
Tarashcha in early November, Ukraine's power ministries have been mobilized 
increasingly in support of Kuchma. Opposition media have found themselves 
pressured more diligently than ever by local police and tax officials. Protests 
organized by an ostensibly incompatible coalition of Communists and nationalist 
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parties have been dispersed forcibly by police. The biggest demonstration -- a 
tent city erected by hundreds of Kharkiv-based protesters in the newly created 
"Ukraine Without Kuchma" movement -- was reportedly destroyed by police with 
little regard for the demonstrators themselves. Several persons were taken to the 
hospital, some with serious injuries. Andriy Bilohryshchenko, the regional leader 
of the Socialist Party, and Oleksandr Holovash, an aide to MP Volodymyr 
Mukhin, were two of the most seriously injured, according to Mukhin. (UNIAN, 
0856 GMT, 12 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
At the same time, several pro-Kuchma demonstrations were taking place. 
Unfortunately, many of them appear to have been arranged using coercive 
techniques. In fact, several Ternopil oblast party organizations recently appealed 
to the Kuchma administration to stop using "force" to make people rally in 
support of the president. The letter accused local government representatives of 
"using their official position and power" to compel "teachers, professors and 
students, state employees and other people... to participate" in demonstrations, 
and said the situation represented an "apogee of pressure of power on the 
public." (KPNEWS.COM, 11 Jan 01)  
 
While local officials, police and tax officials were dealing with protesters, 
demonstrations and the media, Prosecutor-General Potebenko worked tirelessly 
to bury the Gongadze story. For over two months, Potebenko tried to convince 
the world that the body discovered in Tarashcha did not belong to Gongadze, 
even though Gongadze's friends had identified it, based on x-rays. 
 
First, the prosecutor-general's office confiscated the body from the local coroner 
before independent DNA tests could confirm the identification. Then, despite 
promising Gongadze's family and friends that DNA tests would take place 
immediately, the office delayed the tests for weeks, finally undertaking them only 
after Gongadze's mother complained loudly to the international press. 
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Lately, Potebenko has spent most of his time defending his boss, President 
Kuchma. Potebenko has been Kuchma's staunchest supporter during the tapes 
scandal. The tapes, released by Oleksandr Moroz after being secretly recorded 
by Kuchma's former bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, purportedly eavesdrop on 
Kuchma suggesting that he would favor the elimination of Gongadze. Potebenko 
has pronounced the tapes "fake," and suggested that even if they weren't, he 
would not use them as evidence. The material, he said, "was obtained in an 
unlawful way" and, under Ukrainian law, "only materials obtained in a lawful way 
and by relevant bodies which have the right to collect information can be 
accepted as a basis of proof." (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) 
Potebenko has also vilified Melnychenko's character, accusing him of being 
money-hungry, someone else's stooge and a criminal. "We have initiated a 
criminal case against Melnychenko and issued a warrant for his arrest and 
transportation here," he told New Channel Television. (NEW CHANNEL TV, 1700 
GMT, 10 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) What case does the prosecutor have against 
Melnychenko? He left the country quickly, Potebenko told reporters, on a false 
passport and without declaring that his previous job allowed him access to 
classified information. Although Potebenko has appealed to Interpol for help in 
apprehending this fugitive, curiously he has received little response so far. 
 
The Ukrainian parliament, however, has become understandably frustrated with 
the lack of progress of the investigation. On 10 January, Potebenko was called 
before the Ukrainian parliament and finally announced the results of his office's 
DNA tests on the body found in Tarashcha; the tests proved to a probability of 
99.6 percent that the body was Gongadze. The next day, after perhaps receiving 
a less than supportive response to his announcement from his superiors, 
Potebenko apparently changed his mind and suggested that new information 
showed Gongadze may still be alive! (KPNEWS.COM, citing UNIAN, 11 Jan 01)  
 
The furor over Potebenko also has resulted in the collapse of the parliamentary 
pro-presidential majority, as several parties are refusing to support any legislation 
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proposed by the government until Potebenko is removed. In response, Kuchma 
has begun attacking the body for its inaction. 
 
Not to be outdone, Gongadze's mother Lesya has filed a lawsuit asking that 
Potebenko and his deputy, Oleksy Bahanets, be removed. If the Ukrainian court 
system "does not take into account my complaints and does not punish 
Potebenko, who is guilty in the present situation before me, my family, the whole 
country, and the Ukrainian people," she told Radio Liberty, "I will address 
international institutions. I will address Strasbourg." (KPNEWS.COM, 12 Jan 01) 
 
Taras Chornovil, son of Rukh founder Viacheslav Chornovil and now a member 
of parliament, has also offered to address everyone regarding the tapes. He 
suggested on 12 January that Melnychenko's descriptions (in interviews) of 
private conversations Chornovil had with the president were accurate. He has 
asked to hear the tapes in order to "recognize [his] voice and the logic of the 
conversation." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 12 Jan 01; via KPNews.com) Melnychenko 
has suggested that dozens of persons could do the same to help authenticate 
the tapes. So far, the government has not pursued that avenue -- the one 
approach that could vindicate Kuchma easily. 
 
Instead, the government has chosen to use the Ukrainian police and special 
forces to intimidate the press and public in hopes of killing the story. The 
censorship of state-run media to deny much of the Ukrainian people information 
on the scandal is unlikely to be overlooked. 
 
Potebenko's attempts to stymie the investigation into Gongadze's death have 
been disastrous for Ukraine's international reputation as well as the relationship 
between the government and its own people. That President Kuchma has 
allowed him to continue along this path is very telling, unfortunately. The 
president may or may not have committed the initial offense, but there is no 
question that he has allowed his government to make use of tactics reminiscent 
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of Soviet times, with power based on fear and the dissemination of disinformation 
and half-truths. His government now appears to be ignoring its own human rights 
laws and turning its back on the laws of the very international organizations it has 
worked so hard to join. In the process, it has become stagnant and ineffectual. 
Either Kuchma is directing the actions of his government representatives or he 
has lost control of his administration; either way, his continuance in office may 
constitute an obstacle to restoring the confidence of his own people, international 
organizations and other governments. 
 
It is unfortunate that, at a time when Ukraine is finally making economic progress 
and receiving praise for its reform efforts, the status quo should be disturbed. It is 
also worrisome; any uncertainty in a country as volatile politically as is Ukraine -- 
and as dependent on a few oligarchs -- can be problematic. But there appears to 
be no choice. Certainly, Kuchma's prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, would be 
prepared and able to maintain Ukraine's current course, should Kuchma prove 
unable to continue. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Another Andrei Babitsky? 
Ken Gluck, an American relief worker with the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 
was seized by masked men on 8 January -- almost one year since the detention 
of Andrei Babitsky and the start of his ordeal. It also coincides with the return of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assistance 
mission to Chechnya and the arrival of the inspection team from the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly. The latter will report to the Council of Europe 
(CE) prior to its 22 -26 January meeting, when the CE will consider the possibility 
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of reinstating Russia's voting rights, which were suspended last April due to 
violations of humanitarian law in Chechnya. 
 
The Russian military and FSB spokesmen have blamed the Chechens for 
Gluck's disappearance. Chechen spokesmen deny that they are holding Gluck 
and President Aslan Maskhadov has offered a reward for information leading to 
Gluck's return. (ITAR-TASS, 0785 GMT, 11 January 2001; via lexis-nexis) In 
contrast, Lieutenant General Ivan Babichev claimed that the MSF and Gluck are 
to blame for failing to notify the army of their travels. Putin's human rights envoy 
to Chechnya, Vladimir Kalamanov, came to a similar conclusion -- "some 
humanitarian organizations ignore security issues and the rules of the stay in 
Chechnya." (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) The Nobel peace prize-
winning organization vehemently denies such charges. In fact, every two weeks 
Babichev himself signs the paperwork approving the travel plans of the MSF 
personnel. (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 16 Jan 01) 
 
All of this sounds eerily familiar. First the authorities denied that Babitsky was in 
custody, and intimated that his disappearance was his own fault for reporting 
from Chechnya in the first place. Then they said he was collaborating with the 
enemy. Eventually they admitted he was being held in a filtration camp. 
Eventually they let him go, but subjected him to a trial. 
 
In December 2000 Gluck appeared on a Russian talk show and criticized the 
war, visibly upsetting the Russian officials present. Then he became the target of 
harassment at checkpoints where he was repeatedly accused of "collecting 
military information." "From our point of view," said Liphan Basaeva, a 
representative of a leading Russian human rights group, Memorial, the 
"kidnapping was either an organized and well-planned action [by the Russians] or 
an initiative of some Russian military groups controlled by nobody." (CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, 16 Jan 01) Another highly regarded human rights group, 
Glasnost, reports that the residents of Starye Atagi believe that the Russian 
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security services are responsible for the abduction. A Chechen policeman 
confirms that there were orders to arrest Gluck and several operations to capture 
him had failed. (GLASNOST DAILY NEWS SERVICE, 15 Jan 01) 
 
Russian humanitarian groups issued an appeal begging international NGOs not 
to abandon Chechnya. Those who perpetrated this crime wanted the foreigners 
to leave. "We are convinced that the masterminds of this kidnapping are seeking 
the termination of the work of the foreign representatives there in order to isolate 
Chechnya completely from the world community and bring down an iron curtain 
behind which they can perpetuate their heinous crimes. If you suspend your work 
now, you will be doing exactly what they planned." (GLASNOST DAILY NEWS 
SERVICE, 15 Jan 01) 
 
The town where Gluck was kidnapped is the same from which Fred Cuny, an 
American relief worker, disappeared in April 1995. In 1996 the murder of four 
Red Cross workers persuaded foreigners to leave on the eve of the Chechen 
election -- that was at Starye Atagi as well. 
 
Last week UN and EU agencies pulled out of Chechnya. It works every time.  
 
Dyarchy again? 
If not for the war, this month would mark the end of the term in office for 
President Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected in January 1997. However, his 
press service has announced that, in accordance with article 71 of the Chechen 
constitution, the term of office is being extended until 27 January 2002. 
(GLASNOST DAILY NEWS SERVICE, 10 Jan 01) 
 
The Russian government is no hurry to take advantage of this opportunity to hold 
new elections in Chechnya. The director of the Audit Chamber and former prime 
minister, Sergei Stepashin, commented explicitly against the idea of Chechens 
voting and "making a difference." (GLASNOST DAILY NEWS SERVICE, 10 Jan 
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01) Instead there is the expectation of the appointment of the former governor of 
neighboring Stavropol krai, Stanislav Ilyasov, to serve as Chechnya's prime 
minister, under Archmad Kadyrov. (ITAR-TASS, 1635 GMT, 13 Jan 01; lexis-
nexis) Stavropol krai has a substantial Cossack minority that still hankers for the 
three northern districts of Chechnya which were transferred to the republic when 
it was reconstituted after the Chechens were allowed to return from internal exile 
in Central Asia in 1956. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
The merits of creative ambiguity 
During his summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 9-10 January, 
Azerbaijani President Heyder Aliev exhibited an impressive ability to preserve his 
options and maintain maximum room for maneuver. Despite Putin's best efforts 
to entangle Azerbaijan in a tight net of military and political obligations, Aliev 
successfully avoided making any binding commitments, leaving open the 
possibility of enhanced security arrangements with NATO and the US. 
 
Although military contacts with the United States are limited by Section 907 of the 
Freedom Support Act, Azerbaijan does have a military cooperation agreement 
with the US, which was signed in December by General Charles Simpson. The 
upcoming visit by Lord George Robertson, the NATO secretary-general, 
promises to broaden that cooperation. 
 
Putin and Aliev signed an onshore oil contract and a statement of non-binding 
principles on the division of the Caspian Sea. However, Aliev stalled on the 
substantive political and military issues. Although the "Baku Declaration" speaks 
of "readiness to develop long-term bilateral defense and military-technical 
cooperation," the particulars of the military cooperation are not spelled out. 
Moreover, "this cooperation will not be directed against third countries or 
contradict the international commitments of the sides." (INTERFAX, 10 Jan 01; 
via lexis-nexis) This means that the Russian-Armenian military cooperation 
 19 
remains intact, as do Azerbaijan's ambition to join NATO and its policy to 
promote cooperation within the GUUAM framework. 
 
Similarly, no agreement was reached on the status of the Gabala early warning 
radar station. Russia continues to use the station but Azerbaijan politely declined 
to formalize the arrangement. There was complete lack of progress on Nagorno-
Karabakh. Putin called for more bilateral meetings while also mentioning the 
OSCE Minsk Group process. 
 
Of course, it's possible that there are secret deals in the works. Indeed Russian 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev has stated that a program to train Azerbaijani 
officers in Russia will be finalized soon. (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) 
But the mere fact that the question remains an open one is testimony to Aliev's 
diplomatic savvy. He has tried to show that it may be possible to have warm 
relations with Putin without giving him everything he may desire. 
 
During his visit, Russian President Vladimir Putin presented his Azerbaijani 
counterpart with a copy of his diploma from the KGB University in St. Petersburg, 
which graduated Aliev in 1949. Putin commented that he too attended the same 
academy and hence regards Aliev as his "compatriot." (ITAR-TASS, 10 Jan 01; 
via lexis-nexis) That highly symbolic gesture represents an invitation and a 
suggestion to Aliev that he belongs more with Putin and the Chekists than with 
the national cause of the fledgling Azerbaijani state. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
The Caspian region: Southern pipeline route through Iran 
Kazakhstan held discussions in December with France's Total inaElf, British Gas 
and Italy's Agip to study the feasibility of building a Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-
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Iran oil pipeline to transport energy resources of the Caspian Basin to Asia and 
the Pacific region. If the deal goes through, the proposed southern export route 
could deal a significant blow to the US-sponsored plan for a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey. Certain energy analysts and international oil 
companies appear to favor the Iranian route as the economically more profitable 
way to tap northern Caspian energy resources. 
 
The argument over determining energy transport routes has emerged as the 
single most politically charged issue confronting the five Caspian states -- 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. (SIPRI YEARBOOK, 
1999) Prior to 1998, Caspian oil and gas pipelines ran primarily through Russia. 
While Russia sought to preserve its monopoly, the other land-locked Caspian 
states approached Western oil companies about other energy transport corridors 
to relieve their excessive dependence on Russia. 
 
The other Caspian states have considered several alternatives to bypass Russia: 
a western route through Georgia to the Black Sea; a southwestern route from 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey; southern routes 
through Iran, or Afghanistan and Pakistan; and eastern routes from Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan to China. Despite US government objections, certain 
European capitals and multinational oil corporations -- including some US oil 
companies such as Mobil -- prefer the Iranian route as the more profitable viable 
energy transport corridor. (SIPRI YEARBOOK, 1999) 
 
Iran seeks to capitalize on the revenues that will result from the exploitation of 
Caspian energy products and to expand its influence in the region. An Iranian 
pipeline would link the Caspian Basin to the Persian Gulf and place Iran in a 
strategic position to serve as a conduit for energy exports. (JANE'S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 26 Jun 00) 
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The US opposes the Iranian pipeline and increased energy dependence on the 
Gulf states, instead lobbying heavily for a route from Azerbaijan to Turkey's 
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The US is also relying on Kazakhstan's potential 
participation in the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line to ensure the profitability of 
the east-west transit corridor. The US government has been asking Kazakhstan 
to commit enough oil to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line to ensure its economic 
viability if sufficient volumes of oil are not found in Azerbaijan. (FINANCIAL 
TIMES, 11 Dec 00) Elizabeth Jones, recently appointed adviser on Caspian 
energy issues to the US president and a former ambassador to Kazakhstan, 
discussed plans with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev on 13 
December in Almaty for extending the proposed $2.4-billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline to the Kazakh port of Aktau. Kazakhstan's president expressed interest 
in the US plan but no agreement has been reached. 
 
According to the US proposal, 80 percent of the pipeline's capacity of 1 million 
barrels per day would be used for the export of oil from Ajerbaijan's sector of the 
Caspian and the remaining 20 percent would be reserved for Kazakh oil. 
(INTERFAX, 1311 GMT, 13 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1213, via World News 
Connection) Additionally, US diplomats have stressed that if Kazakhstan 
selected the Iranian option, it would be vulnerable to any disruption to the smooth 
passage of oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz, a strategic "choke point" in 
the Gulf. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 11 Dec 00) This should be an important 
impediment for any country wishing to choose the Iranian option.  
 
The US is promoting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to help ensure the 
economic and political independence of the former Soviet states in the Caspian 
region, particularly the South Caucasus, and to enhance regional stability. US 
Caspian regional policy is also designed to ensure access to Caspian energy 
resources and to reduce Western dependence on Middle East oil, as well as to 
prevent Russia from reasserting domination over the region and to prevent Iran 
from gaining a stranglehold on Caspian energy products. 
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Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
A line in the sand 
Like a crowd of persons desperately trying to ignore the presence of a 600-lb. 
gorilla, the West has been resoundingly silent about reports that Russia has 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons in its already heavily militarized enclave, 
Kaliningrad. Only those states in closest proximity to Kaliningrad -- the Baltic 
countries and Poland -- have issued comments on the report by the Washington 
Times published earlier this month. Those statements by and large have been 
calm but concerned, and have included a number of calls for an inspection of the 
region to ascertain what is and isn't there. 
 
According to the paper, the movement of nuclear weapons was detected in June, 
although details did not appear in the Military Intelligence Daily, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's main intelligence report, until December. The newspaper 
cited Clinton administration arms-control officials as suggesting the tactical 
nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad may be part of an attempt by Moscow to test the 
incoming administration of President-elect George W. Bush. (THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES, 3 Jan 01; www.washingtontimes.com) While it is doubtful 
the Russians were so insightful as to predict the outcome of the long-disputed 
November election several months in advance, it is quite likely that the West is 
being tested to see how it will react to Moscow's latest line in the sand. So far, 
the West's reaction is unimpressive. If indeed this move was intended as a 
response to discussions of NATO expansion, NATO has blinked first. In fact, 
NATO keeps on blinking, apparently hoping that the problem will just go away on 
its own.  
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Russia has continued to describe the reports as untruthful, absurd, provocative, 
and meant to distract the world's attention from NATO's own controversies 
concerning depleted-uranium munitions reportedly used in the Balkans. Russia 
has no reason to put tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, according to press 
services and academics. Besides, Russian officials assure the nervous, Russia 
signed an (admittedly nonbinding) agreement to keep the Baltic area nuclear-
free. Alas, as Poland's defense minister, Bronislaw Komorowski, said, "this is a 
problem, whether to treat as credible the assurance from the Russian side that 
there are no nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad Region." He added that Poland 
will continue to monitor the situation closely. (PAP, 1017 GMT, 4 Jan 01; FBIS-
EEU-2001-0104, via World News Connection) Subsequent news reports 
explained that satellite pictures had confirmed the deployment of the weapons, 
while NATO's knowledge of the situation was also made clear. Polish Foreign 
Affairs Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, "As a member state of NATO, Poland 
had and still has information about the situation in Kaliningrad." 
(RZECZPOSPOLITA, 5 Jan 01; FBIS-EEU-2001-0105, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Baltic and Polish leaders have called for international inspections of the enclave, 
but there has been no supportive clamor from other countries. Indeed, despite 
the satellite verification, and broad hints that few persons were surprised by the 
reports of the weapons deployment, Swedes stated -- with a straight face -- that 
there was no need to disbelieve Russian denials. The initial silence of other 
members of the international community has been explained, at best, as meant 
to allow Russia to remove the weapons without an international uproar, thereby 
saving face. 
 
The reason behind such optimism is unclear, however. Russia's leaders have 
shown time and again their lack of concern over Western reactions -- witness the 
continued war against the Chechen people, the refusal to abide by agreements 
to withdraw troops from Transdniestr, the repeated persecutions of Captain 
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Aleksandr Nikitin and businessman Edmund Pope for daring to process 
unclassified information. Each time, the West has issued empty threats that 
demonstrate its ambivalent attitude towards Russian actions. Now, as Russia 
refuses to consider calls for an international inspection of the enclave, and 
requests from the US for more information from the Kremlin likewise remain 
unheeded, the West isn't making even a show of protest, indicating quite clearly 
that Russia will face no price for increasingly aggressive behavior. This does not 
bode well for Kaliningrad's neighbors: While Poland, now a member of NATO, 
may have little to fear that an attack would go unanswered, the Baltic states have 
no such assurances. Worse still for the small countries, indications are evident 
that the West would react much as it has already. 
 
Of course, if the deployment of the weapons is meant to intimidate NATO into 
public acknowledgement that Baltic chances for inclusion in the alliance are 
limited, there is a small chance that the ploy could backfire -- a possibility which 
at least one official in Latvia saw quickly. "In the end it could leave the impression 
among Western policymakers that will decide about NATO expansion that the 
Baltic states have no basis to trust Russia," Latvian Defense Minister Girts Valdis 
Kristovskis told AFP. "Russia is once again showing these policymakers their 
security policy is unpredictable or deceptive." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 8 
Jan 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
However, judging from the low volume of reaction, more likely the opposite is 
true. Estonia's former chief of staff, Major-General Ants Laaneots, explained his 
country's dilemma to the Baltic News Service. "It's like a rattlesnake's rattle to 
Western Europe," Laaneots told BNS. "Personally, I very much doubt if the 
bringing of nuclear missiles to Kaliningrad will help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
ahead in their speedier accession to NATO; it's rather the opposite, because now 
we must wait for the reaction of our so far biggest supporter, the United States," 
he said. (BNS, 1432 GMT, 4 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0104, via World News 
Connection) It looks as though there may be a very long wait 
 25 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2001 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol6/ed0601.html. 
